UPDATE - SUPERIOR : COMMON LAW COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION

Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Middle District
Harrisburg, PA 17101

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

vs.

VERONICA A HANNEVIG, Sui Juris
Appellant, Aggrieved Party, Conusant

vs.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

CLAIM OF CONUSANCE/CLAIM OF COGNIZANCE
PETITION FOR REVIEW (ADDENDUM)
DOCKET NO(S).: 1654 MDA 2006 and TR-0000860-06

Comes now, pursuant to Rule 1513, Appellant, Aggrieved Party, Conusant, VERONICA A HANNEVIG, Sui Juris, hereby submitting her timely motion In Forma Pauperis for consideration of the “Petition for Review” that she had previously appealed to the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas on August 22, 2006. It is Appellant’s understanding that said petition, certified from the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas record on August 21, 2006, is now included in the docket as captioned (1654 MDA 2006). TR-0000860-06 is included, as an appendage to the controversy that, although settled by default in Conusant’s common law, non-commercial jurisdiction wherein perjury is prohibited, remains unresolved within the various Commonwealth of Pennsylvania fictitious commercial jurisdictions.

1. Upon Magistrate Sean P. McGraw’s failure to state legal claims ex rel, quo warranto to my February 13, 2006 inquiry, Appellant, Aggrieved Party, Conusant, VERONICA A HANNEVIG, Sui Juris brought this controversy before the Commonwealth’s commercial courts, subsequent to her Letter Rogatory, as a Claim of Conusance.

2. A Claim of Conusance:

“ . . . is defined to be an intervention by a third person, demanding judicature in the cause against the plaintiff, who has chosen to commence his action out of claimant's court. . . . . 2. It is a question of jurisdiction between the two courts . . . ; and not between the plaintiff and defendant, as in the case of plea to the jurisdiction, and therefore it must be demanded by the party entitled to conusance, or by his representative, and not by the defendant or his attorney. Id. ibid. A plea to the jurisdiction must be pleaded in person, but a claim of conusance may be made by attorney. . . . 3. There are three sorts of conusance. 1. Tentere placita, which does not oust another court of its jurisdiction, but only creates a concurrent one. 2. Cognitio placitorum, when the plea is commenced in one court, of which conusance belongs to another. 3. A conusance of exclusive jurisdiction; as that no other court shall hold pica, &c. Hard. 509 Bac. Ab. Courts, D.” – Bouvier’s

3. Consistent with Rule 1513, Cognitio placitorum Conusant HANNEVIG’s petition for review to the court of common pleas, now accepted by Superior Court, contains a statement of the basis for the jurisdiction of the court; the names of the party seeking review; the name of the government unit and the public officers which made the determination sought to be reviewed; reference to the order or other determination sought to be reviewed; a general statement of the objections to the order or other determination; and a short statement of the relief sought. The statement of objections included subsidiary question fairly comprised therein. It is, and was, not necessary for the petition to include or have annexed thereto a copy of the text, of the order or other determination sought to be reviewed.

4. HANNEVIG anticipated (and did not receive from either Magistrate McGraw, or Judge Vito Geroulo) a fair and unbiased adjudication of the facts presented in accordance with the following precedence:

(a) Miranda v. Arizona. "Where rights secured by the Constitution involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them." Miranda v. Arizona 384 US 436, 491

(b) "The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime." Miller v U.S. 230F 486 at 489;

(c) "There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this exercise of constitutional rights." Sherer v Cullen, 481 F 946

(d) "All laws which are repugnant to the Constitution are null and void" (Marbury vs. Madison,5 U.S. (1803));

(e) "An unconstitutional act is not law-, it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed" (Norton vs. Shelby County,118 U.S.425, pg.442);

(f) "No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound to enforce it" (16 AmJur,2nd, Sec 177).

(g) “Now all acts of legislature apparently contrary to natural right and justice, are, in our laws, and must be in the nature of things, considered as void. The laws of nature are the laws of God; whose authority can be superseded by no power on earth. A legislature must not obstruct our obedience to him from whose punishments they cannot protect us. All human constitutions which contradict his laws, we are in conscience bound to disobey. Such has been the adjudications of our courts of justice.” And cited 8 Co. 118. a. Bonham's case. Hob. 87; 7. Co. 14. a. Calvin's case.); Cf. U.S. v. Cruikshank, 2 Otto 542, 92 U.S. 542, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1875); Church of Holy Trinity v. U.S., 143 U.S. 226, 232 (1892); U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 172, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965) (There is a higher loyalty than loyalty to this country, loyalty to God); and that class of Authority, infra; Blasphemy; Christianity; 11 Serg. & Rawle, 394.

(h) "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642. [Cf. 16A Am.Jur.2d § 270; God] N.B. Robin v. Hardaway, 1 Jefferson 109, 114, 1 Va. Reports Ann. 58, 61 (1772) aff'd. Gregory v. Baugh, 29 Va. 681, 29 Va. Rep. Ann. 466, 2 Leigh 665 (1831)

(i) "We [Courts] have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, that to usurp that which is not given. THE ONE OR THE OTHER WOULD BE TREASON TO THE CONSTITUTION." (Also see: U.S. vs

Will, 449 US 200, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, at pg. 406).

(j) "It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who created the Constitution, as well as those who were responsible for the Bill of Rights - let alone alien to our entire constitutional history and tradition - to construe Article VI as permitting the United States to exercise power under an international agreement without observing constitutional prohibitions. . . . The court has regularly and uniformly recognized the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty." Justice Black

(k) "The constitutions of most of our states (and of the United States) assert that all power is inherent in the people; that they may exercise it by themselves; that it is their right and duty to be at all times armed; that they are entitled to freedom of person, freedom of religion, freedom of property and freedom of the press." Thomas Jefferson

(l) Terrorism is "the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce. . . . the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives" (28 CFR 0.85(l)).

(m) "(I)n our republican forms of government the absolute sovereignty of the nation is in the people [Private Citizens] of the nation: and the residual sovereignty of each state, not granted [contracted] to any of its functionaries, is in the people [Private Citizens] of the state;" [Emphasis mine] - Chisholm vs. Georgia, 2 U.S. (Dall.) 471 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 8th ed., Page 3096.

(n) “The people of this State, as the successors of its former sovereign, are entitled to all the rights which formerly belonged to the King by his prerogative.” [Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9 (N.Y.)(1829), 21 Am.Dec. 89 10C Const. Law Sec. 298; 18 C Em.Dom. Sec. 3, 228; 37 C Nav.Wat. Sec.219; Nuls Sec. 167; 48 C Wharves Sec. 3, 7.]

(o) “The state cannot diminish rights of the people.” [Hertado v. California, 100 US 516.]

(p) “Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its face.” [Aff’d. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 414 (1971); United States v. Singleton, D.C. No. 96-10054-05-FGT, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998);

(q) A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528 (1935) “First. Two preliminary points are stressed by the government with respect to the appropriate approach to the important questions presented. We are told that the provision of the statute authorizing the adoption of codes must be viewed in the light of the grave national crisis with which Congress was confronted. Undoubtedly, the conditions to which power is addressed are always to be considered when the exercise of power is challenged. Extraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies. But the argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify action which lies outside the sphere of constitutional authority. Extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power. The Constitution established a national government with powers deemed to be adequate, as they have proved to be both in war and peace, but these powers of the national government are limited by the constitutional grants. Those who act under these grants are not at liberty to transcend the [295 U.S. 495, 529] imposed limits because they believe that more or different power is necessary. Such assertions of extra constitutional authority were anticipated and precluded by the explicit terms of the Tenth Amendment- 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”;

(r) Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425-426 (1934) “Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not increase granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved. The Constitution was adopted in a period of grave emergency. Its grants of power to the federal government and its limitations of the power of the States were determined in the light of emergency, and they are not altered by emergency. What power was thus granted and what limitations were thus imposed are questions [290 U.S. 398, 426] which have always been, and always will be, the subject of close examination under our constitutional system. The constitutional question presented in the light of an emergency is whether the power possessed embraces the particular exercise of it in response to particular conditions. Thus, the war power of the federal government is not created by the emergency of war, but it is a power given to meet that emergency. It is a power to wage war successfully, and thus it permits the harnessing of the entire energies of the people in a supreme co-operative effort to preserve the nation. But even the war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties.”;

(s) United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921) “We are of opinion that the court below was clearly right in ruling that the decisions of this court indisputably establish that the mere existence of a state of war could not suspend or change the operation upon the power of Congress of the guaranties and limitations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as to questions such as we are here passing upon.” Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 121-127; Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 336, 13 S. Sup. Ct. 622; United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U.S. 505, 571, 19 S. Sup. Ct. 25; McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 61, 24 S. Sup. Ct. 769, 1 Ann. Cas. 561; [255 U.S. 81, 89] United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 326;1 Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Company, 251 U.S. 146, 156, 40 S. Sup. Ct. 106. “It follows that in testing the operation of the Constitution upon the subject here involved the question of the existence or nonexistence of a state of war becomes negligible, and we put it out of view.”;

(t) Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 18 L.Ed. 281 (1866) “The constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and peace, and covers with its shield of protection all classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances. No doctrine involving more pernicious consequences was ever invented by the wit of men that any of its great provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of Government.”;

3. Upon appeal to the court of common pleas, on August 22, 2006, when in the courtroom of Judge Vito Geroulo, rather than answering my question as to how I was perceived by the court (as a “plaintiff” or a “defendant”) Judge Geroulo chose to demonstrate his reply by signaling employed Sheriff Deputies to vicariously assault, search, detain, and shackle me like a ‘fugitive slave’ before bringing me before him without my appeal papers, exhibits, or eyeglasses.

4. The instant matters before this tentere placita court created by this claim of conusance pertains to controversy over ‘jurisdiction’, ‘marketable title’ and ‘absolute ownership’ and is outlined in the brief that was presented to Judge Geroulo and not heard. It is my understanding that the brief was forwarded to your court from the Lackawanna County Clerk of Judicial Records on, or about, September 20, 2006.

5. following is only a synopsis of the full extent of this instant controversy which is detailed in the Petition for Review that was brought before Lackawanna Court of Common Pleas and contained in your file.

6. The questions include, and are not limited to:

(a) Is a “registration plate” the same as a “Flag” at law?

(b) Did Magistrate Sean McGraw have jurisdiction over the subject matter presented to him by the City of Carbondale, James Reed, Dave Fofi, and Joseph Demchak?

(c) Does sufficiency of service of process require a “wet ink” signature?

(d) To what extent does a fictitious person, or entity, have jurisdiction over a person who has absolute marketable title to their property?

(e) Does an owner, issuer, lessor retain ‘absolute ownership’ and unencumbered right to possession of their goods?

(f) Does a filed UCC lien establish a superior claim over a matter in controversy?

(g) At law, Is a non-fictitious person who possess estate or interest required to be licensed by a fictitious entity?

(h) Is the failure of a fiction to rebut a rebuttable affidavit admission of their improper venue and lack of jurisdiction?

(i) Has the 13th Amendment empowered Congress to criminalize noncommercial Americans who choose not to volunteer into commercial servitude?

(j) Is the numbers on the driver license an adhesion contract with an undisclosed commercial foreign entity?

7. Since my appeal to the court of common pleas on August 22, 2006 the following activities are noteworthy:

8. On September 5th The Judicial Conduct Board received my request for an investigation into the court’s behavior as it relates to 18 Pa.C.S.A. 2902(a)(2); Unlawful restraint.

(a) Offense defined.- A person commits an offense if he knowingly:

1. restrains another unlawfully in circumstances exposing him to risk of serious
bodily injury; or

2. holds another in a condition of involuntary servitude. (a) Magistrate Sean McGraw exhibited deliberate indifference to the wrongful acts (criminal conspiracy, criminal trespass, forfeiture of property, involuntary servitude, misrepresentation of the motor vehicle code, collusive actions regarding the theft and receiving of stolen property, (see TR-0000860-06)) of Carbondale Police Officers; James Reed, Dave Fofi, and Joseph Demchak. Magistrate McGraw seems to lack elementary proficiency in matters pertaining to the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions, and jurisdiction, title and ownership.

(b) Court of Common Pleas Judge, Vito Geroulo, exhibited malfeasance with his terroristic threats when he directed Sheriff’s Deputies to assault and bring me before him for my appeal, like a fugitive slave; in handcuffs and leg irons, without my appeal papers and eyeglasses.

9. On September 11, 2006 The Disciplinary Board of The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania received from me a "Complaint Information Form" regarding the behavior of District Attorney, Andrew Jarbola, III, as it relates to collusion, and fraud upon the court; behaviors typically assoicated with corrupt organizations in their exercise of criminal conspiracies and criminal trespass, to wit:

(a) In his August 4, 2006 correspondence re: Commonwealth v Veronica Hannevig, District Attorney, Andrew Jarbola, III, implied that his office was the court of common pleas, and that my “failure to appear” in his office may result in an automatic dismissal of my appeal.

(b) On letterhead dated September 12, 2006 John Francis Dougherty, Disciplinary Counsel, dismissed my complaint stating he had “ . . . found no violation of a Rule of Professional Conduct . . . ” and that such a letter is “generated in the normal course of business of the judicial system in Lackawanna County . . .”

(c) On September 14, 2006 I sought to clarify his letter via e-mail wherein I asked if all the board concurred that Andrew Jarbola “did not violate any Rule of Professional Conduct by failing to address the substantive and fundamental issues of jurisdiction and title.”

(d) On letterhead dated September 14, 2006 Mr. Dougherty stated that he and “the Counsel in Charge of this office; none of the others attorneys you list, presumably taken from the names on our letterhead, had anything to do with consideration of your complaint.”

10. On September 26, 2006 Janet L. Dolan, Director, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, upon failure to respond in her fiduciary duties to my May 22, 2006 request for bona fide “wet ink” documentation of my current “driving record” upon which her stated actions could be taken, mailed to me a “final order of suspension,” in which she included a form, were I to complete would be a “Misstatement of fact . . . a misdemeanor of the third degree, punishable by a fine of up to $2,500.00 and/or imprisonment up to one year (18 PA C.S. Section 4904(b)).

11. Service of the above captioned appeal to Superior Court included Lackawanna County Court Reporter, Kelly-Jo A. Klein. Ms. Klein was ordered to produce, certify and file the transcript, and a copy of the audio cassett tape, of the appellate proceedings she witnessed and recorded in Judge Vito Geroulo’s court on August 22, 2006.

(a) Ms. Klein, in her September 20, 2006 letter (which she mailed on September 26, 2006) states that the audio cassette tape “is not an official record” and implies that she cannot begin transcription of the proceedings unles I send her $120.00.

12. Monetary damages continue to accrue as stated in the Petition to Review submitted on appeal to the court of common pleas, and is now in this file before the superior court.

13. Trespass damages continue to accrue at $10,000 per day as per the “warning” posted on the impounded 1987 Toyota Camry, VIN# JT2SV21E6H3142887, and a metal, un-obscured Title 4 U.S.C. 1, 2, & 3 Civilian American Flag of these united States of America, with the printing "Sovereign, Private Property, Non-Commercial American" that identified an "Exempt Household Automobile" with the recorded lien conspicuously displayed on the Flag by an affixed sticker; 99-cv-2497.

14. Appellant brings this conusant matter Tentere placita at no cost before the common law court of public opinion concurrent with this superior court in forma pauperis to resolve ‘in the interest of justice’ questions of jurisdiction, marketable title and absolute ownership.

15. Conusant believes that this is a matter between the two courts, the noncommercial common law court of public opinion and the commercial Commonwealth courts of Pennsylvania, and NOT the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Appellant.

THEREFORE; Appellant, Aggrieved Party, Conusant, VERONICA A HANNEVIG, Sui Juris, requests that your court find in favor of the common law and that the aforementioned items, her flag and automobile (see, paragraph 13), be immediately returned to her unencumbered by adhesion and unconscionable contracts or agreements, exemplary damages awarded as assessed in the Petition to Review that is found in her file from the lower court, AND that pursuant to Rule 521 you will dutifully “give immediate notice in writing to the Attorney General of Pennsylvania of the existence of a (constitutional) question” regarding the usurpation of noncommercial unaliened Rights into a federal commercial jurisdiction under color of law.

Date: October 3, 2006 Respectfully Submitted,
____________________________________
VERONICA A HANNEVIG, Sui Juris
Appellant/Aggrieved Party/Conusant