UPDATE - SUPERIOR : COMMON LAW COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION

Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Middle District
Harrisburg, PA 17101

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

vs.

VERONICA A HANNEVIG, Sui Juris
Appellant, Aggrieved Party, Conusant

vs.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

CLAIM OF CONUSANCE/CLAIM OF COGNIZANCE
PETITION FOR REVIEW (ADDENDUM)
DOCKET NO(S).: 1654 MDA 2006 and TR-0000860-06

Comes now, pursuant to Rule 1513, Appellant, Aggrieved Party, Conusant, VERONICA A HANNEVIG, Sui Juris, hereby submitting her timely motion In Forma Pauperis for consideration of the “Petition for Review” that she had previously appealed to the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas on August 22, 2006. It is Appellant’s understanding that said petition, certified from the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas record on August 21, 2006, is now included in the docket as captioned (1654 MDA 2006). TR-0000860-06 is included, as an appendage to the controversy that, although settled by default in Conusant’s common law, non-commercial jurisdiction wherein perjury is prohibited, remains unresolved within the various Commonwealth of Pennsylvania fictitious commercial jurisdictions.

1. Upon Magistrate Sean P. McGraw’s failure to state legal claims ex rel, quo warranto to my February 13, 2006 inquiry, Appellant, Aggrieved Party, Conusant, VERONICA A HANNEVIG, Sui Juris brought this controversy before the Commonwealth’s commercial courts, subsequent to her Letter Rogatory, as a Claim of Conusance.

2. A Claim of Conusance:

“ . . . is defined to be an intervention by a third person, demanding judicature in the cause against the plaintiff, who has chosen to commence his action out of claimant's court. . . . . 2. It is a question of jurisdiction between the two courts . . . ; and not between the plaintiff and defendant, as in the case of plea to the jurisdiction, and therefore it must be demanded by the party entitled to conusance, or by his representative, and not by the defendant or his attorney. Id. ibid. A plea to the jurisdiction must be pleaded in person, but a claim of conusance may be made by attorney. . . . 3. There are three sorts of conusance. 1. Tentere placita, which does not oust another court of its jurisdiction, but only creates a concurrent one. 2. Cognitio placitorum, when the plea is commenced in one court, of which conusance belongs to another. 3. A conusance of exclusive jurisdiction; as that no other court shall hold pica, &c. Hard. 509 Bac. Ab. Courts, D.” – Bouvier’s

3. Consistent with Rule 1513, Cognitio placitorum Conusant HANNEVIG’s petition for review to the court of common pleas, now accepted by Superior Court, contains a statement of the basis for the jurisdiction of the court; the names of the party seeking review; the name of the government unit and the public officers which made the determination sought to be reviewed; reference to the order or other determination sought to be reviewed; a general statement of the objections to the order or other determination; and a short statement of the relief sought. The statement of objections included subsidiary question fairly comprised therein. It is, and was, not necessary for the petition to include or have annexed thereto a copy of the text, of the order or other determination sought to be reviewed.

4. HANNEVIG anticipated (and did not receive from either Magistrate McGraw, or Judge Vito Geroulo) a fair and unbiased adjudication of the facts presented in accordance with the following precedence:

(a) Miranda v. Arizona. "Where rights secured by the Constitution involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them." Miranda v. Arizona 384 US 436, 491

(b) "The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime." Miller v U.S. 230F 486 at 489;

(c) "There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this exercise of constitutional rights." Sherer v Cullen, 481 F 946

(d) "All laws which are repugnant to the Constitution are null and void" (Marbury vs. Madison,5 U.S. (1803));

(e) "An unconstitutional act is not law-, it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed" (Norton vs. Shelby County,118 U.S.425, pg.442);

(f) "No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound to enforce it" (16 AmJur,2nd, Sec 177).

(g) “Now all acts of legislature apparently contrary to natural right and justice, are, in our laws, and must be in the nature of things, considered as void. The laws of nature are the laws of God; whose authority can be superseded by no power on earth. A legislature must not obstruct our obedience to him from whose punishments they cannot protect us. All human constitutions which contradict his laws, we are in conscience bound to disobey. Such has been the adjudications of our courts of justice.” And cited 8 Co. 118. a. Bonham's case. Hob. 87; 7. Co. 14. a. Calvin's case.); Cf. U.S. v. Cruikshank, 2 Otto 542, 92 U.S. 542, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1875); Church of Holy Trinity v. U.S., 143 U.S. 226, 232 (1892); U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 172, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965) (There is a higher loyalty than loyalty to this country, loyalty to God); and that class of Authority, infra; Blasphemy; Christianity; 11 Serg. & Rawle, 394.

(h) "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642. [Cf. 16A Am.Jur.2d § 270; God] N.B. Robin v. Hardaway, 1 Jefferson 109, 114, 1 Va. Reports Ann. 58, 61 (1772) aff'd. Gregory v. Baugh, 29 Va. 681, 29 Va. Rep. Ann. 466, 2 Leigh 665 (1831)

(i) "We [Courts] have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, that to usurp that which is not given. THE ONE OR THE OTHER WOULD BE TREASON TO THE CONSTITUTION." (Also see: U.S. vs

Will, 449 US 200, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, at pg. 406).

(j) "It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who created the Constitution, as well as those who were responsible for the Bill of Rights - let alone alien to our entire constitutional history and tradition - to construe Article VI as permitting the United States to exercise power under an international agreement without observing constitutional prohibitions. . . . The court has regularly and uniformly recognized the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty." Justice Black

(k) "The constitutions of most of our states (and of the United States) assert that all power is inherent in the people; that they may exercise it by themselves; that it is their right and duty to be at all times armed; that they are entitled to freedom of person, freedom of religion, freedom of property and freedom of the press." Thomas Jefferson

(l) Terrorism is "the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce. . . . the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives" (28 CFR 0.85(l)).

(m) "(I)n our republican forms of government the absolute sovereignty of the nation is in the people [Private Citizens] of the nation: and the residual sovereignty of each state, not granted [contracted] to any of its functionaries, is in the people [Private Citizens] of the state;" [Emphasis mine] - Chisholm vs. Georgia, 2 U.S. (Dall.) 471 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 8th ed., Page 3096.

(n) “The people of this State, as the successors of its former sovereign, are entitled to all the rights which formerly belonged to the King by his prerogative.” [Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9 (N.Y.)(1829), 21 Am.Dec. 89 10C Const. Law Sec. 298; 18 C Em.Dom. Sec. 3, 228; 37 C Nav.Wat. Sec.219; Nuls Sec. 167; 48 C Wharves Sec. 3, 7.]

(o) “The state cannot diminish rights of the people.” [Hertado v. California, 100 US 516.]

(p) “Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its face.” [Aff’d. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 414 (1971); United States v. Singleton, D.C. No. 96-10054-05-FGT, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998);

(q) A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528 (1935) “First. Two preliminary points are stressed by the government with respect to the appropriate approach to the important questions presented. We are told that the provision of the statute authorizing the adoption of codes must be viewed in the light of the grave national crisis with which Congress was confronted. Undoubtedly, the conditions to which power is addressed are always to be considered when the exercise of power is challenged. Extraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies. But the argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify action which lies outside the sphere of constitutional authority. Extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power. The Constitution established a national government with powers deemed to be adequate, as they have proved to be both in war and peace, but these powers of the national government are limited by the constitutional grants. Those who act under these grants are not at liberty to transcend the [295 U.S. 495, 529] imposed limits because they believe that more or different power is necessary. Such assertions of extra constitutional authority were anticipated and precluded by the explicit terms of the Tenth Amendment- 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”;

(r) Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425-426 (1934) “Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not increase granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved. The Constitution was adopted in a period of grave emergency. Its grants of power to the federal government and its limitations of the power of the States were determined in the light of emergency, and they are not altered by emergency. What power was thus granted and what limitations were thus imposed are questions [290 U.S. 398, 426] which have always been, and always will be, the subject of close examination under our constitutional system. The constitutional question presented in the light of an emergency is whether the power possessed embraces the particular exercise of it in response to particular conditions. Thus, the war power of the federal government is not created by the emergency of war, but it is a power given to meet that emergency. It is a power to wage war successfully, and thus it permits the harnessing of the entire energies of the people in a supreme co-operative effort to preserve the nation. But even the war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties.”;

(s) United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921) “We are of opinion that the court below was clearly right in ruling that the decisions of this court indisputably establish that the mere existence of a state of war could not suspend or change the operation upon the power of Congress of the guaranties and limitations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as to questions such as we are here passing upon.” Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 121-127; Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 336, 13 S. Sup. Ct. 622; United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U.S. 505, 571, 19 S. Sup. Ct. 25; McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 61, 24 S. Sup. Ct. 769, 1 Ann. Cas. 561; [255 U.S. 81, 89] United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 326;1 Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Company, 251 U.S. 146, 156, 40 S. Sup. Ct. 106. “It follows that in testing the operation of the Constitution upon the subject here involved the question of the existence or nonexistence of a state of war becomes negligible, and we put it out of view.”;

(t) Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 18 L.Ed. 281 (1866) “The constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and peace, and covers with its shield of protection all classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances. No doctrine involving more pernicious consequences was ever invented by the wit of men that any of its great provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of Government.”;

3. Upon appeal to the court of common pleas, on August 22, 2006, when in the courtroom of Judge Vito Geroulo, rather than answering my question as to how I was perceived by the court (as a “plaintiff” or a “defendant”) Judge Geroulo chose to demonstrate his reply by signaling employed Sheriff Deputies to vicariously assault, search, detain, and shackle me like a ‘fugitive slave’ before bringing me before him without my appeal papers, exhibits, or eyeglasses.

4. The instant matters before this tentere placita court created by this claim of conusance pertains to controversy over ‘jurisdiction’, ‘marketable title’ and ‘absolute ownership’ and is outlined in the brief that was presented to Judge Geroulo and not heard. It is my understanding that the brief was forwarded to your court from the Lackawanna County Clerk of Judicial Records on, or about, September 20, 2006.

5. following is only a synopsis of the full extent of this instant controversy which is detailed in the Petition for Review that was brought before Lackawanna Court of Common Pleas and contained in your file.

6. The questions include, and are not limited to:

(a) Is a “registration plate” the same as a “Flag” at law?

(b) Did Magistrate Sean McGraw have jurisdiction over the subject matter presented to him by the City of Carbondale, James Reed, Dave Fofi, and Joseph Demchak?

(c) Does sufficiency of service of process require a “wet ink” signature?

(d) To what extent does a fictitious person, or entity, have jurisdiction over a person who has absolute marketable title to their property?

(e) Does an owner, issuer, lessor retain ‘absolute ownership’ and unencumbered right to possession of their goods?

(f) Does a filed UCC lien establish a superior claim over a matter in controversy?

(g) At law, Is a non-fictitious person who possess estate or interest required to be licensed by a fictitious entity?

(h) Is the failure of a fiction to rebut a rebuttable affidavit admission of their improper venue and lack of jurisdiction?

(i) Has the 13th Amendment empowered Congress to criminalize noncommercial Americans who choose not to volunteer into commercial servitude?

(j) Is the numbers on the driver license an adhesion contract with an undisclosed commercial foreign entity?

7. Since my appeal to the court of common pleas on August 22, 2006 the following activities are noteworthy:

8. On September 5th The Judicial Conduct Board received my request for an investigation into the court’s behavior as it relates to 18 Pa.C.S.A. 2902(a)(2); Unlawful restraint.

(a) Offense defined.- A person commits an offense if he knowingly:

1. restrains another unlawfully in circumstances exposing him to risk of serious
bodily injury; or

2. holds another in a condition of involuntary servitude. (a) Magistrate Sean McGraw exhibited deliberate indifference to the wrongful acts (criminal conspiracy, criminal trespass, forfeiture of property, involuntary servitude, misrepresentation of the motor vehicle code, collusive actions regarding the theft and receiving of stolen property, (see TR-0000860-06)) of Carbondale Police Officers; James Reed, Dave Fofi, and Joseph Demchak. Magistrate McGraw seems to lack elementary proficiency in matters pertaining to the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions, and jurisdiction, title and ownership.

(b) Court of Common Pleas Judge, Vito Geroulo, exhibited malfeasance with his terroristic threats when he directed Sheriff’s Deputies to assault and bring me before him for my appeal, like a fugitive slave; in handcuffs and leg irons, without my appeal papers and eyeglasses.

9. On September 11, 2006 The Disciplinary Board of The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania received from me a "Complaint Information Form" regarding the behavior of District Attorney, Andrew Jarbola, III, as it relates to collusion, and fraud upon the court; behaviors typically assoicated with corrupt organizations in their exercise of criminal conspiracies and criminal trespass, to wit:

(a) In his August 4, 2006 correspondence re: Commonwealth v Veronica Hannevig, District Attorney, Andrew Jarbola, III, implied that his office was the court of common pleas, and that my “failure to appear” in his office may result in an automatic dismissal of my appeal.

(b) On letterhead dated September 12, 2006 John Francis Dougherty, Disciplinary Counsel, dismissed my complaint stating he had “ . . . found no violation of a Rule of Professional Conduct . . . ” and that such a letter is “generated in the normal course of business of the judicial system in Lackawanna County . . .”

(c) On September 14, 2006 I sought to clarify his letter via e-mail wherein I asked if all the board concurred that Andrew Jarbola “did not violate any Rule of Professional Conduct by failing to address the substantive and fundamental issues of jurisdiction and title.”

(d) On letterhead dated September 14, 2006 Mr. Dougherty stated that he and “the Counsel in Charge of this office; none of the others attorneys you list, presumably taken from the names on our letterhead, had anything to do with consideration of your complaint.”

10. On September 26, 2006 Janet L. Dolan, Director, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, upon failure to respond in her fiduciary duties to my May 22, 2006 request for bona fide “wet ink” documentation of my current “driving record” upon which her stated actions could be taken, mailed to me a “final order of suspension,” in which she included a form, were I to complete would be a “Misstatement of fact . . . a misdemeanor of the third degree, punishable by a fine of up to $2,500.00 and/or imprisonment up to one year (18 PA C.S. Section 4904(b)).

11. Service of the above captioned appeal to Superior Court included Lackawanna County Court Reporter, Kelly-Jo A. Klein. Ms. Klein was ordered to produce, certify and file the transcript, and a copy of the audio cassett tape, of the appellate proceedings she witnessed and recorded in Judge Vito Geroulo’s court on August 22, 2006.

(a) Ms. Klein, in her September 20, 2006 letter (which she mailed on September 26, 2006) states that the audio cassette tape “is not an official record” and implies that she cannot begin transcription of the proceedings unles I send her $120.00.

12. Monetary damages continue to accrue as stated in the Petition to Review submitted on appeal to the court of common pleas, and is now in this file before the superior court.

13. Trespass damages continue to accrue at $10,000 per day as per the “warning” posted on the impounded 1987 Toyota Camry, VIN# JT2SV21E6H3142887, and a metal, un-obscured Title 4 U.S.C. 1, 2, & 3 Civilian American Flag of these united States of America, with the printing "Sovereign, Private Property, Non-Commercial American" that identified an "Exempt Household Automobile" with the recorded lien conspicuously displayed on the Flag by an affixed sticker; 99-cv-2497.

14. Appellant brings this conusant matter Tentere placita at no cost before the common law court of public opinion concurrent with this superior court in forma pauperis to resolve ‘in the interest of justice’ questions of jurisdiction, marketable title and absolute ownership.

15. Conusant believes that this is a matter between the two courts, the noncommercial common law court of public opinion and the commercial Commonwealth courts of Pennsylvania, and NOT the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Appellant.

THEREFORE; Appellant, Aggrieved Party, Conusant, VERONICA A HANNEVIG, Sui Juris, requests that your court find in favor of the common law and that the aforementioned items, her flag and automobile (see, paragraph 13), be immediately returned to her unencumbered by adhesion and unconscionable contracts or agreements, exemplary damages awarded as assessed in the Petition to Review that is found in her file from the lower court, AND that pursuant to Rule 521 you will dutifully “give immediate notice in writing to the Attorney General of Pennsylvania of the existence of a (constitutional) question” regarding the usurpation of noncommercial unaliened Rights into a federal commercial jurisdiction under color of law.

Date: October 3, 2006 Respectfully Submitted,
____________________________________
VERONICA A HANNEVIG, Sui Juris
Appellant/Aggrieved Party/Conusant

UPDATE - SUPERIOR : COMMON LAW COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION - BRIEF - FILED 12/18/06

IN THE
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Middle District
Harrisburg, PA 17101
DOCKET NO(S).: 1654 MDA 2006 and TR-0000860-06
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
v.
VERONICA A HANNEVIG, Sui Juris, Appellant, Aggrieved Party, Conusant
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Brief

APPEAL FROM THE ORDER and DECREE BY THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LACKAWANNA COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA, CRIMINAL DIVISION, DATED 22, AUGUST 2006 TO CLAIM OF CONUSANCE/CLAIM OF COGNIZANCE PETITION FOR REVIEW DOCKET NO(S).: CP-35-SA-0000064-2006, CP-35-SA-0000065-2006, CP-35-SA-0000066-2006, CP-35-SA-0000067-2006, CP-35-SA-0000068-2006, CP-35-SA-0000069-2006, CP-35-SA-0000070-2006, CP-35-SA-0000071-2006, CP-35-SA-0000072-2006, CP-35-SA-0000073-2006, CP-35-SA-0000074-2006, CP-35-SA-0000075-2006, CP-35-SA-0000076-2006 AND TR-0000860-06.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania pursuant to Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, Title 1, Part V, 1503(a)(c)(4) has jurisdiction to hear this matter in accordance with Amendments one (1) through Ten (10) of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of this Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, including:

Article 1, Section 11 – All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct, and

Article 5, Section 9 - There shall be a right of appeal in all cases to a court of record from a court not of record; and there shall also be a right of appeal from a court of record or from an administrative agency to a court of record or to an appellate court, the selection of such court to be as provided by law; and there shall be such other rights of appeal as may be provided by law, and

U.S.C., Title 28 Rule 70 - If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or to deliver deeds or other documents or to perform any other specific act and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed by the court and the act when so done has like effect as if done by the party. On application of the party entitled to performance, the clerk shall issue a writ of attachment or sequestration against the property of the disobedient party to compel obedience to the judgment. The court may also in proper cases adjudge the party in contempt. If real or personal property is within the district, the court in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof may enter a judgment divesting the title of any party and vesting it in others and such judgment has the effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law. When any order or judgment is for the delivery of possession, the party in whose favor it is entered is entitled to a writ of execution or assistance upon application to the clerk.

Appellant, Aggrevied Party, therefore, brings this conusant matter tentere placita at no cost before the common law court concurrent with this superior court in forma pauperis to resolve ‘in the interest of justice’ questions of jurisdiction (agency), marketable title (identity) and absolute ownership.

Except for prescriptive damages prescribed by both common and statutory law, Conusant believes that this is a matter between the two courts; the noncommercial common law court of public opinion and the commercial Commonwealth courts of Pennsylvania, and not the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Appellant as alleged by the lower courts.

OPINION OF THE LOWER COURTS
To Conusant’s knowledge, neither Magisterial District Court Judge, Sean P. McGraw, nor Court of Common Pleas Judge, Vito Geroulo, has provided an opinion for their determinations on the above captioned matters as of December 15, 2006.

STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Does Magisterial District Court Judge, Sean P. McGraw, upon ex relatione quo warranto inquiry, have a duty to provide statutory proof of claim of the citations he entertains in his fiduciary capacity? To whom is that duty owed?

Did Judge McGraw, the City of Carbondale, James Reed, Badge #126, and Dave Fofi , Badge #110, have the legal authority to support the claims presented? Was it their duty to determine jurisdiction?

Does an unrebutted affidavit, claim or charge stand as truth in commerce?
Does an owner, issuer, lessor retain unencumbered right to possession of their goods?

By what statute pursuant to Title 1, Pa.C.S. 1503(c)(4) did Joseph Demchak, James Reed or Dave Fofi obtain from me bona fide (“wet ink”) signatures that “Acknowledges Receipt of Citation”?

Do Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) filings establish superior claims over agency, identity and ownership?

Is a “registration plate” the same as a “Flag” at law?

If government issued documents, such as a driver’s license and photo identification, are required to establish identity, what is the legal status of someone who chooses not to purchase a government document? What is their lawful status? What is the meaning of “issue”?

Does someone’s voluntary purchase of a government document convey agency, identity and ownership of their estate and interest to a foreign jurisdiction?

Is it lawful for government Agents to discriminate against inhabitants of this Commonwealth who choose not to convey the agency, identity and ownership of their freehold estate and interest to a foreign jurisdiction?

Is an automobile that is not for hire in its primary personal, family and household usage required to be commercially registered?

If an automobile is not commercially registered, is the operator in control of that automobile required to be licensed?

Is a licensed Pennsylvania inspection station required to issue an “official” commercial “certificate of inspection” and emission sticker to an automobile that is not required to be registered?

STATEMENT OF CASE
1. On February 1, 2006, without evidence of a bona fide warrant, City of Carbondale Police Officers James Reed, Badge #126 and Dave Fofi, Badge #110, seized from HANNEVIG, VERONICA A an “Exempt Household Automobile”; a white 1987 Toyota Camry sedan (VIN# JT2SV21E6H3142887), henceforth referred to as “Camry”, and a metal, un-obscured Title 4 U.S.C. §1, 2 and 3 non-gold-fringed, Civilian American Flag of these united States of America, with the printing "Sovereign, Private Property, Non-Commercial American" that identified both her jurisdiction and an "Exempt Household Automobile" with the recorded unrebutted Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) lien conspicuously displayed on the Flag by an affixed sticker; 99-cv-2497, henceforth referred to as “Flag”.

2. At the time of the aforementioned seizure on February 1, 2006, no citations were issued and under Aggrieved Party’s verbal protest, Officers Reed and Fofi contracted with G&G Towing to impound the aforementioned Camry that had a “WARNING” notice on its windshield that cited United States Codes governing “Trespass”.

3. On February 1, 2006 the Camry and Flag were last seen at the parking lot of the Turkey Hill convenience store on Rt. 171, Belmont Street.

4. On February 3, 2006, via Certified Mail (70050390000226773478 and 70050390000226773485) Officers Reed and Fofi were afforded an opportunity to privately resolve a justiciable claim within forty-eight (48) hours of their February 6, 2006 receipt of Veronica Ann; Hannevig’s request to resolve this matter in accordance with law consistent with her non-commercial jurisdiction and their Oaths of Office, specifically within the provisions of Article 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the U.S. Constitution with the first ten (10) Amendments as ratified in 1791.

5. On February 9, 2006 HANNEVIG, VERONICA A received thirteen (13) SUMMONS with attached CITATION/SUMMONS wherein each the “Defendant’s signature” acknowledging receipt of the Citation was indicated by Officer James Reed as “FILED”.

6. HANNEVIG, VERONICA A has no knowledge of her “signature” being “FILED” in acknowledgment of any Citation with the City of Carbondale Police Department.

7. On February 11, 2006 City of Carbondale Clerk, Michelle Bannon provided Officers Reed and Fofi’s oaths of office and Darwin Professional Underwriters, Inc., Public Officials Liability Declaration, Policy Number 0202-0232, which Conusant HANNEVIG accepted as valid.

8. On February 13, 2006 Magistrate Sean McGraw, Esquire, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Magisterial District Court No: 45-3-03 was offered an opportunity to privately resolve a justiciable claim by providing ex rel quo warranto statutory proof that would substantiate the thirteen (13) claims cited by Officer James Reed. Attached to this offer was Veronica Ann; Hannevig’s Affidavit of Non Corporate Status with its Memorandum of Law and Points of Authority in Support, the UCC-9 classification of “consumer goods” as provided in law on 5/30/1999, her Affidavit of Publication of her Legal Notices for that lien that were run for four (4) consecutive weeks beginning 5/27/1999 to 6/16/1999 and copies of the Certified Mail receipts from the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, PA State Police, Lackawanna County Sheriff’s Department, the Department of Revenue, and the Attorney General’s office indicating their receipt of the Newspapers’ Affidavit of the publications with a copy of the Legal Notice. The notice advised the reader that her “Exempt Household Automobile” would be identified by a private Flag showing "Sovereign, Private Property, Non-Commercial American" were enclosed.

9. On March 17, 2006 Veronica Ann; Hannevig requested of Mark Taffera, Director of The Rose Center, that he coordinate a neutral forum for mediation between her and Magistrate Sean McGraw, Esquire to resolve underlying principles involved with diverse jurisdictions and the return of her property; i.e., the Camry and the Flag. Diverse jurisdictions being recognized internationally as “the law of the flag”.

10. On March 17, 2006 HANNEVIG, VERONICA A received from Magistrate Sean McGraw, Esquire, dated 3/16/06, thirteen “NOTICE OF TRIAL SUMMARY CASE”, Docket Nos.: TR-0000155-06, TR-0000158-06, TR-0000162-06, TR-0000160-06, TR-0000157-06, TR-0000164-06, TR-0000165-06, TR-0000166-06, TR-0000159-06, TR-0000161-06, TR-0000163-06, TR-0000153-06, AND TR-0000154-06 wherein he stated, “This court has received your plea of NOT GUILTY to the above summary violation(s). The sum of $.00 has been accepted as collateral for your appearance at trial.”

11. Neither HANNEVIG, VERONICA A or Veronica Ann; Hannevig entered a plea “NOT GUILTY” to Magistrate Sean McGraw, Esquire’s District Court No: 45-3-03, nor did they grant him power of attorney to enter a plea on her behalf.

12. Magistrate Sean McGraw, Esquire exercised silence to Veronica Ann; Hannevig’s offer to him to privately resolve a justiciable claim by providing statutory proof that would substantiate the thirteen (13) claims cited by Officer James Reed.

13. Magistrate Sean McGraw, Esquire was non-response to Veronica Ann; Hannevig’s offer to resolve by alternate dispute resolution, i.e., the mediation referenced in paragraph nine (9), to resolve the underlying principles and interests involved with an adjudication of title as it applies to the Conusant’s claim to diverse jurisdictions.

14. Magistrate Sean McGraw, Esquire exercised silence with regard to the return of HANNEVIG, VERONICA A, and Veronica Ann; Hannevig’s property, i.e., the Camry and the Flag, and, his ‘act of law’, which focused on issues not germane to the instant matter, precluded Judge Vito Geroulo from fulfilling his obligation to the court and adjudicating the substantive issues regarding agency (jurisdiction), identity (marketable title) and (absolute) ownership.

15. By Magistrate Sean McGraw, Esquire’s decision not to pre-emptively adjudicate the substantive questions regarding agency (jurisdiction) consistent with the Flag, and identity (marketable title) and (absolute) ownership of the Camry, Magistrate McGraw has delayed resolution to the irrelevant actions upon which the above captioned dockets are predicated.

16. Consistent with the law of the Flag and her non-commercial jurisdiction wherein she is obligated to her Sovereign to ‘agree with her adversary quickly, while she is with him in the way’, on April 17, 2006 each of the thirteen (13) pleas listed as Docket Nos.: TR-0000155-06, TR-0000158-06, TR-0000162-06, TR-0000160-06, TR-0000157-06, TR-0000164-06, TR-0000165-06, TR-0000166-06, TR-0000159-06, TR-0000161-06, TR-0000163-06, TR-0000153-06, AND TR-0000154-06 were “FULLY ACCEPTED AND RETURNED FOR VALUE. Secured Party, Veronica Ann; Hannevig, further “REQUEST TITLE BE RELEASED AND THE ACCOUNT CLOSED” thereby establishing unencumbered freehold jurisdiction and jurisdictional “title” to her UCC-1 fiction, Conusant HANNIVIG, VERONICA A.

17. Although the Secured Party for VERONICA A HANNEVIG had fully accepted Magistrate McGraw’s not-guilty plea and requested the title be released and the account closed, the NOTICES referred to in paragraph 10 included the threat “Should you fail to appear for your trial, a warrant may be issued for your arrest.”

18. On May 1, 2006, a trial was held and Magistrate Sean McGraw, Esquire, upon presentment of evidence wherein Officers Reed and Fofi stated that they did not know the difference between a Flag and a Registration Tag/Plate in law, Magistrate McGraw convicted VERONICA A HANNEVIG of TR-0000155-06, TR-0000158-06, TR-0000162-06, TR-0000160-06, TR-0000157-06, TR-0000164-06, TR-0000165-06, TR-0000159-06, TR-0000161-06, TR-0000163-06, TR-0000153-06, and TR-0000154-06; and, not guilty of TR-0000166-06, 75§4581§§A2, Officer Reed’s false entry of “Failure to Use Safety Belt System”.

19. On June 29, 2006, City of Carbondale Mayor, Justin Taylor was noticed in writing via hand carried correspondence dated June 28, 2006 that it had been in excess of 145 days since officers Reed and Fofi had seized VERONICA A HANNEVIG’s property and she had not yet been advised in writing as to the disposition of the white 1987 Toyota Camry. The correspondence advised that the mandated automobile insurance would be due on July 1st, 2006 and she had not yet been notified as to who holds title to either her or the aforementioned white 1987 Toyota Camry.

20. Chief of Police, City of Carbondale, Jeff Taylor and Officers Reed and Fofi received a copy of the correspondence referenced in paragraph 19 via Certified Mail 70051820000818337982 on June 30, 2006.

21. On July 12, 2006 VERONICA A HANNEVIG received by regular mail Summons TR-0000860-06/Ciation B3206329-0 submitted by Officer Joseph A. Demchak, Badge #101, re: “title request by G&G Towing”, claiming “Defendant did abandoned the above vehicle for more than 24 hrs at G&G” and citing S75§7311.1. (See paragraph three (3).)

22. On July 13, 2006 TR-0000860-06/Ciation B3206329-0 was hand delivered to Magistrate McGraw’s office with a NOTICE reminding him that it was not VERONICA A HANNEVIG that abandoned the Camry at G&G Towing (see paragraph three (3)); as she, too, had requested that the title holder come forward and assert their claim of legal ownership.

23. On July 14, 2006 a copy of the paragraph 19 “NOTICE” was filed with the Clerk of Judicial Records for placement in the Court of Common Pleas appeal file pursuant to Rule 324(2).

SUMMARY
24. As of this date, persons of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania have failed to statutorily substantiate that Officers Joseph Demchek, James Reed and Dave Fofi’s claims of agency, identity and ownership over Conusant and her property, is superior to that of her freeholder and Sovereign pursuant to Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, Title 1, Part V, 1503(a)(c)(4) and U.S.C., Title 28 Rule 70.

25. Magistrate McGraw, acting on behalf of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, rather than exercising his options to return to VERONICA A HANNEVIG what she presumed to be her property as previously described in paragraph one (1), and levy judgment against the officers who failed to perform their constitutional duties with fidelity and integrity, exercised his right to remain silent on all of the relevant issues presented to him as set forth in the administrative documents here, in this above captioned file, contained; and, by an “act of law” in his judicial authority, Magistrate McGraw, chose to hinder and delay equitable resolution in what appears to be a “collusive action” to convey the title of a creditor.

26. Persons of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania having failed to produce a compulsory counterclaim to Secured Party, Veronica Ann; Hannevig’s acceptance of Magistrate McGraw’s unsolicited “not guilty” pleas and her request that unencumbered title be released to her have defaulted in their obligation to perform in the function for which they were hired.

ASSESSMENT OF THIS JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY
27. The instant matters before this tentere placita court created by this claim of conusance in the Letter Rogatory, the August 21, 2006 Petition For Review, and the Petition For Review (Addendum), pertain to controversy over agency ‘jurisdiction’, identity ‘marketable title’ and ‘absolute’ ownership.

28. Except for prescriptive damages prescribed by both common and statutory law, Conusant believes that this is a matter between the two courts; the noncommercial common law court of public opinion as secured by Pa.C.S. Title 1, Part V, 1503(a)(c)(4) and the commercial Commonwealth courts of Pennsylvania, and not the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Aggrieved Party, Appellant.

29. Because the Title 4 U.S.C. §1, 2 and 3 non-gold-fringed, Civilian American Flag of these united States of America, which Conusant presumed to be the banner of her sovereign’s jurisdiction, had been seized and not returned, she believes that, by their silence, Officers Joseph Demchek, James Reed and Dave Fofi, and Magistrate Sean McGraw, Esquire, have treasonously (U.S. Constitution, Article III, Section 3) breached the duties of their Oaths of Office by not immediately addressing, and appropriately responding to a blatant internationally recognized ‘act of war’.

30. Whether by omission or commission the persons of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s failed to adhere to statutory procedure set forth in Pa.C.S. Title 75 Section 7305 and Rules of Civil Procedure governing Actions at Law as they apply to the seizure and impound of the controverted Flag and the Camry VIN# JT2SV21E6H3142887.

31. Unless otherwise proved by a thorough review of the records brought forth in this above captioned case, by omission or commission, the persons of the City of Carbondale and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania have engaged in a Title 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983 constitutional tort of “theft” of Conusant’s property; i.e., the Flag.

32. Unless otherwise proved by a thorough review of the records brought forth in this above captioned case, by omission or commission, the persons of the City of Carbondale and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania have engaged in a Title 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983 constitutional tort of “theft” of Conusant’s property; i.e., the Camry VIN# JT2SV21E6H3142887.

33. The ‘act of law’ set forth by Magistrate McGraw, upon which the consequences of Conusant’s appeals to agency, identity and ownership of her freehold and controverted property are predicated, have been brought before this Superior Court of Pennsylvania to be adjudicated pursuant to both statutory and common law as these laws apply to the inhabitants of Pennsylvania who are other than a Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment United States citizen in voluntary servitude to Congressional legislation.

34. Monetary damages continue to accrue as noted during the administrative attempts to resolve this justiciable controversy immediately following the yet to be adjudicated seizure, or theft, (whatever the court opines in writing) of the controverted; Flag of these united States of America, the Camry VIN# JT2SV21E6H3142887, and Conusant’s freehold.

CONCLUSION
35. Agents of the Commonwealth having failed to comply with Title I, Pa.C.S. 1503(c)(4), Rules of Criminal Procedure; 521(a)(b), 588(A)(B) and Rule 324(B)(2)(3), and Rules of Civil Procedure; 1032(a)(b), 1061(a)(b)(1, et seq.) and Rule 1029(e)(1) in specifically denying the averments of facts set forth ex rel quo warranto, and in Conusant’s Letter Rogatory and petitions for review, as they relate to agency (jurisdiction), identity (marketable title) and absolute ownership, have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

36. Appropriate relief and damages are assessed on the judgment in this action as follows:

37. Upon the Courts’ determination that a document, obligation or deed affecting the Aggrieved Party’s right, lien, title or interest in the properties in controversy is cancelled or is valid, invalid or discharged;

38. The Court shall enter a final judgment ordering the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and their agents, the prothonotary, or the recorder of deeds to file, record, cancel, surrender or satisfy of record, as the case may be, any plan, document, obligation or deed determined to be valid, invalid, satisfied or discharged, and to execute and deliver any document, obligation, property or deed necessary to Appellant HANNEVIG to make the decree effective;

39. The Court shall enter any other order necessary for the granting of proper relief, including, and not limited to;

40. The immediate delivery of one (1) metal, un-obscured Title 4 U.S.C. 1, 2, & 3 Civilian American Flag of these united States of America, with the printing "Sovereign, Private Property, Non-Commercial American" "Exempt Household Automobile" and an affixed sticker on which is printed 99-cv-2497, and restitution of $266.00 if delivered, $x,xxx,xxx.00 if not delivered,

41. The immediate delivery, unencumbered by adhesion and unconscionable contracts or agreements, of one (1) 1987 Toyota Camry VIN# JT2SV21E6H3142887, $63,609.64 if delivered, $x,xxx,xxx.00 if not delivered,

42. Exemplary damages of $xxx,xxx,xxx.00for abuse of due process, detainment and deprivation of Aggrieved Party’s liberty to travel in pursuit of the necessities of life and happiness,

43. Exemplary damages of $x,xxx,xxx.00 for illegal or unlawful seizure of private property without a lawful and true 4th Amendment Warrant,

44. Exemplary damages of $x,xxx,xxx.00 for unlawful distraint/interstate detainer under color of law,

45. Exemplary damages of $x,xxx,xxx.00 for cruel and unusual punishment, . . . conspiracy, encroachment, abuse of authority under color of law,

46. Exemplary damages of $x,xxx,xxx.00 as consistent with non-commercial and commercial statute and rules governing “fraudulent conveyances” and “wrongful acts”,

47. Total damages as of December 11, 2006 are assessed to be $xxx,xxx,xxx.00,

48. Notwithstanding the Courts’ ultimate decisions, Damage for Delay at Wall Street Journal 7 ¼%, Prime Rate Percentage on 1/3/2006 is $xxx,xxx,xxx.00.

49. A default judgment in favor of Appellant, Aggrieved Party, Conusant, VERONICA A HANNEVIG, against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is ordered.



__________________________________________
VERONICA A HANNEVIG, Sui Juris
Appellant/Aggrieved Party/Conusant
xxx MAIN STREET
XXXXXXX, PENNSYLVANIA XXXXX

An Act of War: An open letter to state lawmakers and their elected representatives.

Greetings, Lawmakers.

On May 8, 2006 I filed with the court of common pleas, Lackawanna County, to appeal thirteen (13) criminal convictions pursuant to the Pennsylvania Title 75 Motor Vehicle code.

On August 22nd, while present in the court of common pleas for that appeal, Judge Vito Geroulo announced "Commonwealth vs. Hannevig." To better understand what I was going to be dealing with before I entered his bar, I attempted to clarify with him which case was being tried; the one from the magistrate (wherein I am a "defendant"), or my appeal (where I am a "plaintiff")?

The judge, Geroulo, told me I was "wasting" his time.

I asked again, explaining that this appeal was brought to the court as a "Claim of Conusance"/"Claim of Cognizance" wherein it was up to the courts to resolve the controversy, and I wanted to be prepared to enter the court based on how I was being perceived.

Instead of replying to my question, Judge Geroulo said I was in "contempt" and signaled the Sheriff's deputies.

Like a fugitive slave, I was handcuffed and taken to a room where I was searched and put in a holding cell. About 5 - 10 minutes later, I was put in leg irons and re-handcuffed, this time, with the belt to hold my hands frimly against my waist and taken back into court for regurgitation of the issues that brought me there from the magistrate's court for the appeal!

Everything the Carbondale officer, James Reed, said clearly pointed to the fact that he was dealing with a non-commercial American jurisdiction that he was not familiar with.

When asked, "Do you know the difference between a flag and a registration plate?" City of Carbondale Police Officer, James Reed replied, 'No. But, I know the difference between a Pennsylvania registration plate and one that is not recognized as a Pennsylvania registration plate.'

I reminded the judge that 'I came here to address the issue of diversity of jurisdiction in a professional manner. And, wherein I was prepared to enter the court as a "non-combatant neutral," I find myself in the position of a "belligerent"; the result of an "act of war" that began with the seizure of the non-commercial American flag of my jurisdiction; an American Flag which, 'by "design"' is different from the one in his courtroom!'

This is clearly NOT an issue for the courts, but an issue for the Lawmakers who make the laws upon which the courts must act. Here is my appeal. I removed the actual spelling of my name, because the principles of this redress applies to all real Americans who recognize the Truths contained therein. Our current laws must be altered, reformed or abolished in a manner consistent with our allegiance and our lawmakers' oaths of office. I am not alone. Click above the arrow on the screen below to witness for yourself the realities for Americans' who believe themselves to be free.

(If the video disappears from YouTube - again, search for Florida Attorney, Elizabeth Ritter the woman in the red jacket who the police laughed about shooting during a "free trade protest" in Miami in November, 2003.)

* * * * * * * * * * * *

I remind you that your:

Silence is equated with fraud - U.S. vs. Tweel, (5th Cir. 1977) 550 F.2d 297

Silence is Consent/Acquiescence - U.S. vs. Prudden, (5th Cir. 1970) 424 F.2d 1021,1023
Cert. Denied, 400 U.S. 831, 91 S.Ct.62, 27L.Ed.2d 62 (1970)
---------------------------------

Pursuant to her Claim of Conusance, Plaintiff/Aggrieved Party/Conusant, VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX, appeals the decisions of Magistrate District Judge, Sean P. McGraw, Magisterial District 45-3-03 to this court to determine Commonwealth v. Vxxxxxxx Hxxxxxxx on the merits of the above captioned dockets consistent with International Law and maritime jurisdiction. Conusant HXXXXXXX makes this appeal as a third person to this controversy who is demanding judicature in the cause against Carbondale Police Officers; James Reed (Badge 126) and Dave Fofi (Badge 110), and Magistrate Sean P. McGraw who had chosen to commence their action out of Vxxxxxxx Ann; Hxxxxxxx’s court and declare war on her Conusant, VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX. While Carbondale Police Officers; James Reed (Badge 126) and Dave Fofi (Badge 110) ‘should know’ the difference between a flag and a registration plate at law, Magistrate McGraw’s abuse of discretion in his failure to correct their ignorance is even more significant in that it brings dishonor to the court. With documented unrebutted foreknowledge of the material facts in this instance prior to his May 1, 2006 conviction of Aggrieved Party/Conusant, HXXXXXXX, Magistrate McGraw had ‘reason to know’ that The Law of the Flag Ruhstrat v. People, 57 N.E. 41 is a “ . . . term . . . used to designate the RIGHTS under which a ship owner, who sends his vessel into a foreign port, gives notice by his flag to all who enter into contracts with the ship master that he intends the Law of that Flag to regulate those contracts, and that they must either submit to its operation or not contract with him or his agent at all."

Plaintiff/Aggrieved Party/Conusant, VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX (aka, HXXXXXXX), situate to the jurisdiction identified in strict accordance with the Title 4 U.S.C. §§1, 2 and 3, and Executive Order 10834, Flag of these united States of America comes now before this court with the reserved option to remain a neutral body, entrusted by ‘covenant’ and ‘consignment’ to protect and forever defend the ‘quiet enjoyment’ of ‘perfect title’ to her ‘freehold estate’ against any and all unauthorized ‘takings’ by ‘tortious’ seizures and premeditated, deceitful, legal alienation, that is, and has been, implemented by design. Conusant, HXXXXXXX is petitioning in this court for governmental redress of grievances under the Constitution and Laws of these united States of America and under the Constitutional Charter of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Conusant, HXXXXXXX, contends that the Thirteen criminal controversies alleged in Commonwealth v. Vxxxxxxx Hxxxxxxx were based on fraud and, therefore, void from their inception. They were at no time legally valid, and no proof of claim was ever brought forth by which they could be executed.

As if the seizure of HXXXXXXX’s property, the capture of her flag, and the defendants failure to state a claim in this case weren’t grounds enough to bring this action, to her amazement, malicious behaviors continued to be exhibited by additional Commonwealth officers and fiduciaries even after her appeal was filed.

Aggrieved Party/Conusant, HXXXXXXX, therefore, brings before this court a ‘claim and delivery’ of her personal property that includes an ‘action to quiet title’ to which both she and the defendants lay claim.

HXXXXXXX is further aggrieved by the lower court’s failure to recognize the jurisdictional implications brought forth by the condemnation of the flag of Conusant’s jurisdiction wherein she enjoyed absolute, marketable ownership and title to her private goods. Magistrate McGraw’s failure to demand rebuttal to rebuttable affidavits and identify, and immediately dismiss, a deliberate ‘act of war’ by affiants Reed and Fofi demands exemplary and compensatory default relief be granted as it applies to the law and the facts in this instant and must include the full extent of the damages to which VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX is due in general relief at the discretion of the court. Statutorily compensible damages are currently estimated to be in excess of $215,620,133.01 and are not limited to the wrongful acts of Carbondale Police Officers; James Reed (Badge 126) and Dave Fofi (Badge 110), but include Magistrate Sean P. McGraw’s “abuse of discretion” (Commonwealth v Begley, 780 A.2d 605, 620 (Pa.2001)). As documented in Vxxxxxxx Ann; Hxxxxxxx’s April 27, 2006 Letter Rogatory to the courts, Officer Reed, Officer Fofi, and Magistrate McGraw failed to defend against a claim that had been brought to their attention with reasonable consideration of the facts and the law pertaining to the matter submitted.

It should be duly noted that the facts and the law pertaining to Magistrate McGraw’s subsequent convictions on issues brought before him by Carbondale Police Officers Reed and Fofi, were not germane to Conusant’s unrebutted affidavits of jurisdiction and was further complicated by the Officers’ and Magistrate’s defaults to her good faith offers to resolve these matters, now before the court, within the parameters acceptable in “private law.” These offers which are outlined in Hxxxxxxx’s Letter Rogatory included; providing Officers Reed and Fofi, and Magistrate McGraw, personal opportunity to resolve these now justiciable matters outside of a court of law, Alternative Dispute Resolution (i.e., Mediation), and her full acceptance of each of the thirteen (13) “not guilty” pleas entered by Magistrate McGraw without her authorization.

Conusant HXXXXXXX also prays determination of whether Magistrate McGraw, further violated his judicial and professional canons on 7/11/06 when he participated with Carbondale Police Officer Joseph A Demchak (Badge #101) in a fictitious action regarding the issue of “title” that had already put before him for deliberation, and, to which he had defaulted in judgment. Such an action suggests a pattern of ‘abuse of discretion’, that began, in this case, with Magistrate McGraw’s ‘colorable cause or invocation of jurisdiction’ when he accepted the ‘colorable claims’ brought to him by Officers Reed and Fofi in their inexcusable, ignorant, wrongful, misuse of power under ‘color of law’.

The actions of each of the aforementioned ‘persons’ are objectively inconsistent with their accepted oath of office as that oath pertains to Article 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Rule 521 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Court, the preservation of common law, and the Constitution of these united States within its limitations as set forth in December, 1791 by the ratification of its first ten (10) Amendments. The solemn oath that they, and their predecessors, took to “preserve, protect and defend” an organic, lawful, noncommercial, jurisdiction appears to have been statutorily usurped by a commercial jurisdiction wherein Consuant, HXXXXXXX must intercede for the courts to reveal their presumption and perception as to her standing before them. To ascertain the extent of that legislative usurpation, and to provide an authority for lawful remedy upon which the Attorney General may act, Conusant, VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX, appeals to this court to provide final determination and record to the following questions consistent with the fundamental provisions of organic law that defined and established, by organic act, the limited powers beyond which scope of powers thereby granted are deemed void. Conusant HXXXXXXX reminds the reader that the Pursuant to American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 442; “It is not the function of our government to keep the Citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the Citizen to keep the government from falling into error.”

Carbondale Police Officers James Reed (Badge 126) and Dave Fofi (Badge 110), and Magistrate Sean P. McGraw’s disregard to provide substantial performance within the context of their job description leaves only the remedies of resolution by jury, or payment in lawful tender. That payment continues to accrue at a rate of $30,000.00 daily and, with the treble damages allowable in this jurisdiction, is currently in excess of $215,620,133.01 Two Hundred Fifteen Million Six Hundred Twenty Thousand One Hundred Thirty-three Dollars and One Cent.

FUNDAMENTAL FACTS AND SUBSTANTIVE BACKGROUND

Conusant HXXXXXXX is pursuing remedy to this Claim of Conusance, which, unfortunately, has become a justiciable controversy, concurrently in a non-commercial American common law court of her jurisdiction; a jurisdiction wherein she enjoys the unalterably established inherent, indefeasible and unaliened Rights upon which American governments were instituted; governments that were predicated on their fundamental organic precepts that render void any law that would require her to pay for a benefit and privilege that she inherently possesses. Such payment for the enjoyment of an inherent Right is even more despicable, repugnant and outrageous when demanded in seditiously promulgated debt currency.

Unlike within the American jurisdiction that is represented by her Title 4 U.S.C. Civilian Flag, Conusant is fully aware that the current United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions have been interpreted by their courts to require that only “one accused of a ‘serious offense’ be given a jury trial.” Commonwealth v. Mayberry, 327 A.2d 86, 98 (Pa. 1974). The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States has “established a fixed dividing line between petty and serious offense: those crimes carrying more than six months sentence are serious and those carrying less are petty crimes.” She understands that it is well settled in these courts, that “no right to a jury trial exists at such trials when a sentence of six months or less is imposed . . . The right to trial by jury preserved by the Pennsylvania Constitution is the right as it existed when such provision was first written into the state Constitution and does not apply to a summary proceeding for an ordinance violation.” Bacik v. Commonwealth, 434 A.2d 860, 863 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1981). Conusant also appeals without counsel pursuant to Commonwealth v. Long, 688 A.2d 198, 201 (Pa.Super. 1996) which states that there is “no requirement, either under the United States Constitution or under the Pennsylvania Constitution, that defendants in all summary cases be provided with counsel,” and she is cognizant that the legal duties of a municipal (prize) court is to (according the 'Lectric Law Library and Encyclopedia Britannica) determine the legality of captured goods and vessels at sea, i.e., in interstate commerce. Therefore, the seizure of the non-commercial American flag that denotes VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX’s jurisdiction and was displayed on her automobile with the recordation of a valid lien is the fundamental matter of issue, fact, law and record to this appeal and stand unrebutted.

Magistrate District Judge, Sean P. McGraw, the CITY OF CARBONDALE, the CITY OF CARBONDALE POLICE DEPARTMENT, James Reed (Badge #126), Dave Fofi (Badge #110), Jeff Taylor (City of Carbondale Chief of Police), Justin Taylor (Mayor), and/or their predecessors and other officers of the commonwealth, failed to rebut affidavits by VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX’s Secured Party/Agent that were agreed to, witnessed, noticed and duly recorded at the Lackawanna County Courthouse, or the Federal Building in Scranton. Such disregard to provide substantial performance within the context of their job description leaves only the remedies of resolution by jury, or payment in lawful tender. Since resolution by jury is now prohibited by interpretation to preclude controversy in excess of twenty dollars, payment for damages is currently in excess of $215,620,133.01 Two Hundred Fifteen Million Six Hundred Twenty Thousand One Hundred Thirty-three Dollars and One Cent and must be made in lawful tender.

VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX, therefore, appeals to this court that the following facts and substantive law be reviewed and compared to Magistrate Sean P. McGraw’s conviction. And, based on the strict exercise of judicial judgment rooted in historical facts and fundamental law, that fair and equitable judgment be rendered guided by the spirit and integrity of sound principles such as those preserved in the ancient Book of Exodus, Chapter 23, verses 1 through 9. Such exercise of discretion will be reviewable only for an abuse thereof.

QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW

1. STATE V. BURLINGAME 146 Mo. 207 48 S.W. 72 6 Pet. 632 1 Starkie Ev. 544; admits that an affidavit that is not rebutted is considered prima facie evidence that will remain sufficient in the judgment of law to establish a given fact.

Does an unrebutted affidavit that was witnessed, noticed, published, and recorded arise to the admission set forth in STATE V. BURLINGAME 146 Mo. 207 48 S.W. 72 6 Pet. 632 1 Starkie Ev. 544?

2. Pursuant to International Law ‘The Law of the Flag’ is defined as;

" .. a rule to the effect that a vessel is a part of the territory of the nation whose flag she flies. The term is used to designate the RIGHTS under which a ship owner, who sends his vessel into a foreign port, gives notice by his flag to all who enter into contracts with the ship master that he intends the Law of that Flag to regulate those contracts, and that they must either submit to its operation or not contract with him or his agent at all." Ref.: Ruhstrat v. People, 57 N.E. 41

Is a “registration plate” the same as a “Flag” at law?

3. Because McCann v. Greenway, 952 F.Supp. 647, 651 (W.D.Mo. 1997) admits (emphasis added) that;

" . . . as a matter of law . . . in flag manufacture, a fringe is not considered to be a part of the flag, and is without heraldic significance . . . even if the plaintiff could prove that [a yellow fringe] converted the state court's United States flag to a maritime flag of war, the Court cannot fathom how the display of a maritime war flag could limit the state court's jurisdiction."

What prohibits the court from returning to Conusant HXXXXXXX her property and the Title 4 U.S.C. American Flag?

And, since the court in McCann v. Greenway admitted that the “fringe is not considered to be part of the flag,” What is this court’s interpretation of Title 4 U.S.C. § 3 wherein it states;

“Any person who, within the District of Columbia, in any manner, . . . shall place or cause to be placed any . . . design . . . of any nature upon any flag, standard, colors, or ensign of the United States of America; or shall expose or cause to be exposed to public view any such flag, standard, colors, or ensign upon which shall have been printed, painted, or otherwise placed, or to which shall be attached, appended, affixed, or annexed any . . . design . . . of any nature; . . . shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $100 or by imprisonment for not more than thirty days, or both, in the discretion of the court. The words “flag, standard, colors, or ensign”, as used herein, shall include any flag, standard, colors, ensign . . . of the United States of America . . . by which the average person seeing the same without deliberation may believe the same to represent the flag, colors, standard, or ensign of the United States of America” as the code applies to: a) jurisdiction, b) the placement of “any . . . design” on the American flag, c) the various uses of the word “design”, and, d) the fine and imprisonment associated with the deceptive exposure to the public of a flag other than the one authorized by law?

4. According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, Prize Courts, which emanated from Maritime Law, and said to be “not to the entire exclusion of the courts of the states” in Black’s Law Dictionary are described as;

”. . . municipal courts, and their character and organization are thus determined by national tradition and law, they apply customary and conventional international law. There is a practice of long standing for belligerents, at the outbreak of war, to enact prize law through statutory legislation; such enactments are presumed to be declaratory of international law but are, in any event, binding on the courts. ”

Given the material evidence in this controversy that includes ‘diversity of jurisdiction’, and Magistrate McGraw’s municipal court displayed a yellow fringed flag which, according to the International Law of the Flag, represents a flag different from the one in controversy; Was Magistrate McGraw ethically obligated by his oath of office to inform Officers Reed and Fofi that their capture of an American’s private goods and her Title 4 U.S.C. Civilian flag may be in conflict with their oaths of office?

And, because Bouvier’s Law Dictionary defines nationality as;

“The state of a person in relation to the nation in which he was born . . . he cannot, however, renounce his allegiance without permission of the government” and the Court in McCann v. Greenway admits that it, “cannot fathom how the display of a maritime war flag could limit the state court's jurisdiction,” please state for the record the principles of organic law that would, in this instant case, prohibit the court’s recognition of an American in the exercise of her Liberty to remain within the sovereignty of her American birthright jurisdiction, in her own country, under the lawful American flag that denotes the non-commercial laws by, and in, which she travels?

Is not the capture of a bona fide lawful flag that denotes the jurisdiction of another a blatant act of war?

By what authority does a judge withhold fundamental Rights from an American for ‘ransom’ until she renounces her allegiance to her American flag and the republic for which it stands?

Additionally, please state in the record of this review whether it is within the purview of Magistrate McGraw’s canon and oath of office, to prevent, collude or conspire with others (by chain or otherwise), under color of law, to carry out the condemnation and vesting of title of his fellow Americans into the jurisdiction of a captor government until that capture is complete and the spes recuperandi is gone?

”SPES RECUPERANDI. The hope of recovery. This term is applied to cases of capture of an enemy's property as a booty or prize. As between the belligerent parties, the title to the property taken as a prize passes the moment there is no longer any hope of recovery. 2 Burr. Rep. 683. Vide Infra praesidea; Jus Postliminy; Bopty; Piize. Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 1856”

”From The 'Lectric Law Library's Lexicon On Prize Court: In order to vest the title of the prize in the captors, it must be brought with due care into some convenient port for adjudication by a competent court. The condemnation must be pronounced by a prize court of the government of the captor sitting in the country of the captor, or his ally; the prize court of an ally cannot condemn. Strictly speaking, as between the belligerent parties the title passes, and is vested when the capture is complete; and that was formerly held to be complete and perfect when the battle was over, and the spes recuperandi was gone. ”

5. Conusant, VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX, travels under the laws of her Title 4 U.S.C. non-commercial American Civilian flag as a matter of conscience, and she has not asked permission to renounce her allegiance, therefore;

State for the public record an admission or denial that the judicature has not allied and conspired with a belligerent captor that provides legislative sanctions for the “seizure,” “taking,” and/or “requisitioning” of title by which the capture of a nation is perfected.

What are the principles, public policies and statutes of law that requires Conusant HXXXXXXX to voluntarily participate in an insidious business scheme that she believes to be based on fraud?

Which of the jurisdictions in controversy, the one represented by the yellow fringe, or the one strictly defined by Title 4 U.S.C., holds title to Conusant, VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX?

6. Prior to the May 1, 2006 trial, Officers Reed and Fofi, and Magistrate McGraw chose to remain silent to Conusant’s request to resolve the material aspects of this matter as it pertains to the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code’s recognition of the Title 4 U.S.C. flag, i.e., the plain view “insignia” that duly notifies Law Enforcers of the jurisdiction of her ‘neutral property’ in, and at law.

Therefore; If title has not yet been passed and vested in the captor government; Cite for the record the true and correct, easily discernable, fundamental organic precepts of law that preclude a noncombatant neutral to obtain peaceful recognition from the commonwealth, and secure to her the blessings of liberty to, as a matter of conscience, not participate in a commercial scheme wherein she must be documented through “government issued identification” that includes, and is not limited to, the ‘licensure’ of previously enjoyed rights, and debt based ‘liens’ on her property?

FACTS OF LAW

1. First and foremost is the organic lawful noncommercial jurisdiction as provided for in the Pennsylvania Constitution’s Preamble and Article I, and, the United States Constitution, as ratified in December 1791 with Amendments One (1) through Ten (10); each of which James Reed (Badge #126), Dave Fofi (Badge #110), had sworn their oaths of office. The organic lawful noncommercial jurisdiction can be best summarized by McCullough v. Brown, 19 S. E. 458, 480, 23 L.R.A. 410 which states, "[Unalienable rights] are enumerated rights that individuals, acting in their own behalf, cannot disregard or destroy."

2. Secondly, in addition to the limits placed on governments within the commonwealth by the Constitution of Pennsylvania, (not limited to Article I, Section 17; “No ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, or making irrevocable any grant of special privileges or immunities, shall be passed.”) the U.S. Constitution, also places Limits on the Powers of Congress and the States consistent with the indefeasible and “unalienable Rights” of the people, presumably, those who remain subject to the soverignty of their Creator within the context of the Declaration of Independence. Limitations of the Powers of Congress includes within Article I; Section 9, that states, “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed,” and, Section 10, that “No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility” and, “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.”

3. In the context of the Constitution, a Bill of Attainder is meant to mean a bill that has a negative effect on a single person or group (for example, a fine or term of imprisonment). Originally, a Bill of Attainder sentenced an individual to death, though this detail is no longer required to have an enactment be ruled a Bill of Attainder. I remind the reader that while the inclusion of this protection appears to be valid for an American who remains subject to the soverignty of his or her Creator, the 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution allows an American the personal option to re-venue him or herself into a commercial form of servitude; either through voluntary cession, or by being duly convicted of a crime that is legislated and enforced by Congress.

”The 13th Amendment - Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. ”

4. An ex post facto law in U.S. Constitutional Law, is found in Calder v Bull (3 US 386 [1798]). In the opinion of Justice Chase:

”1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime,when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender. ”

5. Essential to the background of this appeal is the U.S. Supreme Court case, YICK WO v. HOPKINS, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) a man learned in law stated:

”When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the principles upon which they are supposed [118 U.S. 356, 370] to rest, and review the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. And the law is the definition and limitation of power. It is, indeed, quite true that there must always be lodged somewhere, and in some person or body, the authority of final decision; and in many cases of mere administration, the responsibility is purely political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of the public judgment, exercised either in the pressure of opinion, or by means of the suffrage. But the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by those maxims of constitutional law which are the monuments showing the victorious progress of the race in securing to men the blessings of civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous language of the Massachusetts bill of rights, the government of the commonwealth 'may be a government of laws and not of men.' For the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself. ”

6. Then, in sharp contrast to the Yick Wo decision (a mere 47 years after), the U.S. Supreme Court in TERRACE v. THOMPSON, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) stated:

”Alien inhabitants of a state, as well as all other persons within its jurisdiction, may invoke the protection of these clauses. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 , 6 S. Sup. Ct. 1064; Truax v. Raich, supra, 239 U.S. 39 , 36 Sup. Ct. 7, L. R. A. 1916D, 545 Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283. The Fourteenth Amendment, as against the arbitrary and capricious or unjustly discriminatory action of the state, protects the owners in their [263 U.S. 197, 217] right to lease and dispose of their land for lawful purposes and the alien resident in his right to earn a living by following ordinary occupations of the community, but it does not take away from the state those powers of police that were reserved at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 , 5 S. Sup. Ct. 357; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 663 , 8 S. Sup. Ct. 273; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 683 , 8 S. Sup. Ct. 992, 1257; In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 449 , 10 S. Sup. Ct. 930; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 , 14 S. Sup. Ct. 499; Phillips v. Mobile, 208 U.S. 472, 479 , 28 S. Sup. Ct. 370; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622, 623 S., 35 Sup. Ct. 140. And in the exercise of such powers the state has wide discretion in determining its own public policy and what measures are necessary for its own protection and properly to promote the safety, peace and good order of its people. . . .

”The rights, privileges and duties of aliens differ widely from those of citizens; and those of alien declarants differ substantially from those of nondeclarants. . . . The alien's formally declared bona fide intention to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to the sovereignty to which he lately has been a subject, and to become a citizen of the United States and permanently reside therein markedly distinguishes him from an ineligible alien or an eligible alien who has not so declared. . . .

”In Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch, 603, 609, 619, 620 (3 L. Ed. 453), it was said, per Story, J.: 'It is clear by the common law, that an alien can take lands by purchase, though not by descent; or in other words he cannot take by the act of law, but he may by the act of the party. ... In the language of the ancient law, the alien has the capacity to take, but not to hold lands, and they may be seized into the hands of the sovereign.' See also 1 Cooley's Blackstone (4th Ed.) 315, * 372; 2 Kent's Commentaries (14th Ed.) 80, *54. ”

7. So then, comes now former “declarant” VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX, now Conusant to Secured Party/Agent, (“nondeclarant”) Vxxxxxxx Ann; Hxxxxxxx, with full acceptance of the self-evident truth of her residency within the parcel of land that came from, and is sustained by that which comes from the earth wherever her feet shall trod. Like many other Americans, VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX accepts the self-evident truths succinctly worded in the Declaration of Independence; that “Governments are instituted among Men” to secure unalienable Rights that they are endowed with by their Creator.

8. Because of “the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitles” her by virtue of this nation’s founding documents, she is comfortable with a degree of non-religious logic and confidence in declaring in her “residence” that she was born in the United States, a diplomatic representatives by hereditary succession of the Kingdom of Heaven, wherein is her “domicile”. She, furthermore, accepts as her banner/flag/ensign the Civilian, non-commercial American, Title 4 U.S.C. §§1, 2 and 3, Flag of these united States of America and its description as defined in Presidential Executive Order 10834 (see the Federal Register at Vol. 24. No. 166, P.6365 – 6367). This American Flag is unmutilated by fringe and accurately identified in International Law. It is recognized by every person as the banner for a peculiar nation of people who have self-evident claim to the property, rights, privileges and immunities granted to them and their heirs by hereditary succession by a Soverign Grantor who set in motion the Laws of Nature, i.e., the life giving, life sustaining forces of the heavens and the earth and all that is in them.

9. Therefore, Conusance, VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX, in addition to the aforementioned Judgments herein request that this court issue an Estoppel Judgment against any and all subversive activities by officers vested with powers within the COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA. This Estoppel Judgment will prevent any further overt or covert legislative acts directed toward the overthrow of our constitutional republic upon which the courts must act, and will facilitate the independent exercise of commonwealth powers and discretion in determining its own public policy for restoring recognition and dignity to its non-commercial (i.e., “nondeclarant”) people as they travel and seek absolute marketable ownership and title of all property and automobiles, the right of which is alleged to be, and can be, properly defended by law, but is not now the crux of this case.

10. Once again addressing the legal principles set forth in TERRACE v. THOMPSON, 263 U.S. 197 (1923), it becomes obvious that the historical roots of VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX’s case can be further extrapolated from the embolden portions of the previously mentioned 'Lectric Law Library's Lexicon On Prize Court:

In order to vest the title of the prize in the captors, it must be brought with due care into some convenient port for adjudication by a competent court. The condemnation must be pronounced by a prize court of the government of the captor sitting in the country of the captor, or his ally; the prize court of an ally cannot condemn. Strictly speaking, as between the belligerent parties the title passes, and is vested when the capture is complete; and that was formerly held to be complete and perfect when the battle was over, and the spes recuperandi was gone.

And the Encyclopedia Britannica’s definition of a Prize Court wherein it states:

. . . There is a practice of long standing for belligerents, at the outbreak of war, to enact prize law through statutory legislation; such enactments are presumed to be declaratory of international law but are, in any event, binding on the courts.

In the 20th century, unrestricted sea warfare involving the destruction of merchant shipping has reduced the role of prize courts. The United States has held no prize courts since 1899 for the additional reason of its more liberal policy of requisitioning (i.e., “Taking”) foreign vessels with compensation rather than appropriating them as prizes.

11. Perhaps even more telling of this insidious encroachment into the Liberties once enjoyed by every American is the seditious pettifogging gibberish spewed into the judiciary with doublespeak titles that project onto true Americans who long for justice the intent of a less than benevolent agenda. An example of such a title is this: “Anti-Government Movement Guidebook 1999, National Center for State Courts.” The book advises the judiciary how to handle "The Rise of Common Law Courts in the United States: An Examination of the Movement, The Potential Impact on the Judiciary, and How the States Could Respond." Should you feel the need to consult this book to be advised as to how you will handle this appeal, it is good that you be reminded that the statutory provisions you cling to today will ultimately set the snare at law that will entangle and duly convict you and your 14th Amendment children and grandchildren of some crime tomorrow.

FACTS OF THE CASE

All references to any such codes, rules, regulations, statutes or decisions/findings from all courts “within” the UNITED STATES and the COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA are hereby for reference only in like manner as such code, rules, regulation, statute or decision/finding from courts “within” the UNITED STATES and the COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA is applicable to each of the above captioned Affiants; the persons, COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, SEAN P. MCGRAW, ESQ MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT COURT 45-3-03, CITY OF CARBONDALE POLICE DEPARTMENT, James Reed (Badge #126), Dave Fofi (Badge #110), Jeff Taylor (City of Carbondale Chief of Police), John J. Szymanski (County of Lackawanna Sheriff), Pedro Cortez (Secretary of State) and Tom Corbett (Attorney General), in the discharge of the duties of their profession with fidelity, dignity, courtesy and efficiency.

VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX travels without license because in order to obtain a State license she must volunteer to tell a lie that she is engaged in the commercial activities of interstate commerce. Since she is not engaged in interstate commerce and, therefore, does not require a license she has no need to perjure herself to obtain one. Conusant does have a writ to travel that is recorded at the Lackawanna County Courthouse and in the Federal Building, Scranton.

Because VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX does not have a commercial drivers license (and refuses to lie with knowledge and forethought to get one) she is statutorily prohibited from ‘driving’ a vehicle that is registered in commerce. Her lawful remedy, therefore, was found in the Pennsylvania statute governing diversity of jurisdiction.

Pursuant to 28 USC § 1333(1), the "Savings to Suitors Clause" and the Law of the Flag, an International Law, under which a non-commercial Title 4 U.S.C. §§1, 2 and 3, and Presidential Executive Order 10834, Civilian American Flag of the united States of America as found in the Federal Register at Vol. 24. No. 166, P.6365 – 6367 and recognized by every nation, on February 1, 2006, at a location described as 32 BELMONT STREET, CARBONDALE, (a Turkey Hill parking lot) James Reed and Dave Fofi, acting in their professional capacity as employees of the federally funded CITY OF CARBONDALE, CITY OF CARBONDALE POLICE DEPARTMENT municipal person(s), having Title 23 CFR § 1250 et seq., and other pecuniary interest for their activities, including the Emergency Medical Services (Act 45 of 1985), CAT/MCARE (Act 13 of 2002), JCP, and ATJ, willfully dispossessed by seizure, and have not returned, nor have they revealed to me their claims against Vxxxxxxx Ann; Hxxxxxxx and her absolute and marketable ownership and title to her property. I have received and examined Officer’s Reed and Fofi’s signed oaths of office and liability policy. Both my Secured Party and myself, upon examination, have accepted the solemnity of their oath to perform their law enforcement duties with fidelity to both the Pennsylvania and the United States Constitution in accordance with the Yick Wo v. Hopkins decision.

Repeated efforts to privately resolve a common law claim that is justiciable within both the common law and the equity venues of this jurisdiction have been met with either silence, or have been countered with threats of fines, costs, arrest and imprisonment.

On February 2, 2006 Officer Reed (Certified Mail 70050390000226773478) and Officer Fofi (Certified Mail 70050390000226773485) were offered an opportunity to privately resolve this matter by simply returning my flag and my 1987 Toyota Camry. Neither Officer Reed nor Officer Fofi responded to my offer.

On February 13, 2006 upon receipt of the Thirteen (13) SUMMONS from SEAN P. MCGRAW, ESQ, municipal MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT COURT 45-3-03, COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, they were returned to him with accompanied by a Certified Mail, SECOND OPPORTUNITY TO PRIVATELY RESOLVE A JUSTICIABLE CLAIM, CLAIM OF CONUSANCE, ex relatione, quo warranto to his proof of claim:

1. That he has the legal authority to support the claims presented by the City of Carbondale, James Reed and Dave Fofi.

2. That an unrebutted affidavit, claim or charge does not stand as truth in commerce and that an owner, issuer, lessor does not retain right to possession of their goods, and

3. That on 02-01-06 James Reed or Dave Fofi obtained from me thirteen (13) bona fide (“wet ink”) signatures that “Acknowledges Receipt of Citation”.

4. That the UCC-1 filing I have with the Secretary of State does not establish a superior claim over the conusant fiction “VXXXXXXX HXXXXXXX” and, therefore, establishes diversity of jurisdiction.

5. That the purchase price for the invalid Registration Tag from Pennsylvania (expired 12-92), and the four (4) invalid Registration Plates from Nevada had not been discharged, and I continue to be the issuer of, and lessor assigned to those numbers, and that they can’t forgive my ignorance and correct the mistake by returning the Nevada plates in the stamped ‘priority mailer’ I gave them addressed to DMV Nevada.

6. That a 1987 Toyota sedan does not have passive automatic seatbelt restraints.

7. That a “registration plate” serves the same purpose as a “Flag” at law.

8. That I need a license because I do not possess estate or interest and, that the Toyota sedan is for hire in its primary personal, family or household usage.

9. That a noncommercial automobile, properly recorded under the Flag of its jurisdiction, requires an “official” commercial “certificate of inspection” and that, upon request, I would be issued an inspection and emission sticker at a licensed Pennsylvania inspection station.

10. That I do not require a commercial drivers license to drive/operate a commercially registered automobile.

On March 16, 2006 Magistrate, Sean McGraw, responded with Thirteen (13) “NOTICE OF TRIAL SUMMARY CASE” indicating that his court had received a plea of “NOT GUILTY” to each of the Thirteen (13) citations to which I received no clarification for Officer James Reed’s claims. Sean McGraw scheduled VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX’s trial for May 1, 2006 at 4:15 PM.

On March 17, 2006 I requested to schedule a Mediation with Magistrate Sean McGraw to privately resolve our conflicts about:

1. The meaning of “unalienable Rights”.

2. The purpose of the prize court of the municipal magistrate as defined in the Encyclopedia Britannica.

3. The meaning of the noncommercial Title 4 U.S.C. 1, 2 and 3 Civilian American Flag of the united States of America as it applies to a Police Officer’s oath of office.

4. The meaning in law that is symbolized by the capture of the Flag of another’s nation.

5. The Pennsylvania vehicle code that allows for noncommercial travel and diversity of jurisdictions; i.e., the commercial vs. the noncommercial, or the liened vs. the unaliened.

6. Who owns title to the 1987 Toyota Camry. And,

7. Who holds title to the Conusant fiction, VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX.

Sean McGraw has not responded to my request to mediate and resolve this conflict between the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and those who, like myself, expect protection and defense in their choice not to re-venue from an organic lawful noncommercial jurisdiction into a legislated statutory commercial jurisdiction.

On April 17, 2006 my Secured Party fully accepted Magistrate McGraw’s not guilty pleas and returned each for value, and requested that title be released and the account be closed.

On, or about, April 27, 2006 I motioned a common law court for removal of the controverted dockets, submitted a praecipe to notify actions are being removed in the interest of justice, and submitted a Letter Rogatory for removal of the dockets to a commonlaw court in the interest of justice.

On May 1, 2006 both Officers Reed and Fofi admitted in the presence of Magistrate Sean McGraw that they did not know the difference between a flag and a registration plate in law.

On May 1, 2006 Magistrate McGraw convicted VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX of criminal acts with full knowledge that neither Officer Reed nor Officer Fofi knew the difference between a flag and registration plate in law.

On May 8, 2006 the aforementioned praecipe, motion, and Letter Rogatory was subsequently filed with my appeal to the court of common pleas.

DISCREPANCIES

Among other wrongful acts, by their silence, Magistrate District Judge, Sean P. McGraw, the CITY OF CARBONDALE, the CITY OF CARBONDALE POLICE DEPARTMENT, James Reed (Badge #126), Dave Fofi (Badge #110), Jeff Taylor (City of Carbondale Chief of Police) and Justin Taylor (Mayor) have failed to provide to me the fundamental function for which they were hired.

Magistrate District Judge, Sean P. McGraw, Magisterial District 45-3-03, erred in his Initial Decision when he failed to recognize that when a Police Officer of the City of Carbondale fails to discharge his duties with fidelity, dignity, courtesy and efficiency and he purports to act in an official capacity or takes advantage of such actual or purported capacity he:

“commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, knowing that his conduct is illegal, he: subjects another to arrest, detention, search, seizure, mistreatment, dispossession, assessment, lien or other infringement of personal or property rights; or denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power or immunity.”

It has now been in excess of Two hundred (200) Days since February 1, 2006, the date that City of Carbondale Police Officers James Reed and Dave Fofi detained, seized, mistreated, dispossessed, assessed, liened and infringed on Vxxxxxxx Ann; Hxxxxxxx’s personal and property rights that has denied and impeded her in her exercise and enjoyment of the right, privilege, power and immunity to unalienable ownership and travel within and among the venue of a noncommercial American; i.e., the land of her endowment.

And, in that:

“A public servant commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, in contemplation of official action by himself or by a governmental unity with which he is associated, or in reliance on information to which he has access in his official capacity and which has not been made public, he: acquires a pecuniary interest in any property, transaction or enterprise which may be affected by such information or official action; speculates or wagers on the basis of such information or official action; or aids another to do any of the foregoing.”

Chief of Police, Jeff Taylor, by his failure to have properly trained his employees to comply with their oaths of office VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX’s unalienable Right to remain in a noncommercial jurisdiction, appears to have conspired with a foreign commercial power. Wherein James Reed and Dave Fofi found no reason to cite VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX on Feburary 1, 2006, and could have resolved this matter in the private by returning to Vxxxxxxx Ann; Hxxxxxxx her property as she requested via Certified Mail, and James Reed signed for on 2/6/06 (Exhibit 4), James Reed, on February 6, 2006 chose to bring 13 charges against VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX, claiming on his citations that VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX had acknowledged receipt of citation, and her signature is “FILED”.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Appellant is here today because of presumption that have been promulgated by historical precedence and additional rulings by judicial belligerents based on the principles set forth in TERRACE v. THOMPSON; a ruling that blatantly demands that a lawful freeholder submit a formally declared bona fide intention to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to the sovereignty to which he lately has been a subject, and to become a citizen of the United States and permanently reside therein so that he markedly distinguishes him from an ineligible alien or an eligible alien who has not so declared.

Upon learning (in 1997) that she would be required to tell a lie to obtain a State Drivers License (i.e., to volunteer that she was engaged in interstate commerce by paying an alleged fine to a federal or national entity), Appellant chose to assert her unalienable Right to travel securely under the flag of her non-commercial jurisdiction rather than to transgress the laws of her sovereign. Officers Reed and Fofi, and Magistrate McGraw failed to honor their oaths of office with fidelity pursuant to Article 1, Section 3, of the Pennsylvania Constitution wherein it states:

”All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship or to maintain any ministry against his consent; no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience, and no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship.”

Because Affiant has no known contract with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, other than those allowed in Article 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and she has received no rebuttals (timely or otherwise) from any person to letters, notices and affidavits, some of which were recorded as early as 1998, it is evident that the persons, COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, SEAN P. MCGRAW, ESQ MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT COURT 45-3-03, CITY OF CARBONDALE POLICE DEPARTMENT, James Reed (Badge #126), Dave Fofi (Badge #110), Jeff Taylor (City of Carbondale Chief of Police), John J. Szymanski (County of Lackawanna Sheriff), Pedro Cortez (Secretary of State) and Tom Corbett (Attorney General), have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

A default judgment is, thereby, warranted and tort damages are to be awarded consistent with the statutory limitations placed on the aforementioned employees by their oaths of office. The penalties assessed for their wrongful acts must be consistent with those upon which this court must act and the following private property immediately returned to VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX unencumbered with unconscionable and adhesion contracts or declarations inconsistent with the Laws of her jurisdiction:

A metal, un-obscured Title 4 U.S.C. §§1, 2 and 3, and Presidential Executive Order 10834, Civilian American Flag of these united States of America as found in the Federal Register at Vol. 24. No. 166, P.6365 – 6367, with the printing "Sovereign, Private Property, Non-Commercial American" that identified an "Exempt Household Automobile" with the recorded lien conspicuously displayed on the Flag by an affixed sticker; 99-cv-2497 (Exhibit 3), and

A 1987 White Toyota Camry formerly identified by embossed Vehicle Identification Numbers (VIN) JT2SV21E6H3142887, and

Any and all titles that have been requisitioned by the United States and passed from VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX to the United States without full disclosure as to the effect it would have on her presumed sovereignty as articulated in the document commonly referred to as “The Declaration of Independence”, and the first Ten Amendments – also known as The Bill of Rights – to the U.S. Constitution as ratified in 1791.

VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX has been of the understanding that the substantive purpose of the legislative, judicial and executive Powers of governments are to secure the inherent, unalienable and indefeasible Rights of mankind, and that the just powers of governments are derived from the governed, and that whenever abuses and usurpations reduce such governmental powers to the Despotism of a real, or legally defined fictitious “person”, it is the duty of he or she who is governed to alter, reform or abolish their government in such manner as they may think proper in order to provide new Guards for their future security.

Therefore, because an unrebutted affidavit stands as truth in this court’s commercial jurisdiction, an unrebutted affidavit, becomes the judgment in commerce and a lien or claim can be satisfied only through rebuttal by affidavit point-by-point, resolution by jury, or payment in lawful united States of America, Article I, Section 10, tender, you are herewith directed to assess the criminal penalties accrued by the tacit procuration of; the CITY OF CARBONDALE, the CITY OF CARBONDALE POLICE DEPARTMENT, James Reed (Badge #126), Dave Fofi (Badge #110), Jeff Taylor (City of Carbondale Chief of Police), Justin Taylor (Mayor), and, Magistrate McGraw’s failure to honor my creditor’s acceptance of his “NOT GUILTY” plea at the “sum of $.00” and, that her title be released and the satisfied account closed.

The aforementioned municipal persons have demonstrated a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the ‘policy and custom’ of the fundamental organic lawful noncommercial jurisdiction to which they and their employees have sworn their oaths of office: An oath of office that VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX accepted as valid in that it implies that employees of the CITY OF CARBONDALE support, obedience and defense of the limitations placed on their job descriptions which includes, and is not limited to, Article I, Section 17, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania; “No ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, or making irrevocable any grant of special privileges or immunities, shall be passed.”

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

By their tacit procuration the CITY OF CARBONDALE, CITY OF CARBONDALE POLICE DEPARTMENT municipal persons have demonstrated a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the ‘policy and custom’ of the organic lawful noncommercial jurisdiction to which they and their employees have sworn their oaths of office; and, they have failed to rebut the justiciable elements of this controversy.

An unrebutted affidavit stands as truth in commerce. An unrebutted affidavit becomes the judgment in commerce. A lien or claim can be satisfied only through rebuttal by affidavit point-by-point, resolution by jury, or payment in lawful united States of America, Article I, Section 10, tender. Because resolution by jury is unavailable to Plaintiff/Aggrieved Party/Conusant pursuant to Commonwealth v. Mayberry, 327 A.2d 86, 98 (Pa. 1974) and Bacik v. Commonwealth, 434 A.2d 860, 863 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1981) the court must award payment for damages in lawful tender. That payment is currently in excess of $215,620,133.01 - Two Hundred Fifteen Million Six Hundred Twenty Thousand One Hundred Thirty-three Dollars and One Cent.

Magistrate District Judge, Sean P. McGraw, the CITY OF CARBONDALE, the CITY OF CARBONDALE POLICE DEPARTMENT, James Reed (Badge #126), Dave Fofi (Badge #110), Jeff Taylor (City of Carbondale Chief of Police) and Justin Taylor (Mayor) have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. By their silence they have:

1. AGREED that Vxxxxxxx Ann; Hxxxxxxx’s unrebutted affidavit of her self-evident standing in American common law and claim to the property, rights, privileges and immunities granted to her and her heirs by hereditary succession stands as truth in this court of commercial jurisdiction.

2. AGREED that Vxxxxxxx Ann; Hxxxxxxx’s metal, un-obscured Title 4 U.S.C. 1, 2 Civilian American Flag of the united States of America, with the printing "Sovereign, Private Property, Non-Commercial American" that identified an "Exempt Household Automobile" with the recorded lien conspicuously displayed on the Flag by an affixed sticker; 99-cv-2497 be immediately returned.

3. AGREED that the Law of the Flag, an International Law, by which jurisdictions are recognized and respected, and reciprocal agreements, arrangements and declarations honored, be used to begin to resolve the right of way travel conflicts between non-commercial Americans and commercial U.S. citizens under the current Pennsylvania Vehicle Code.

4. AGREED that Vxxxxxxx Ann; Hxxxxxxx’s private property, the 1987 Toyota Camry be immediately returned to her without cost or other unconscionable or adhesion stipulations.

5. AGREED that pursuant the Affiants’ wrongful acts as identified in the laws to which they swore their oaths of office, compounded by their subsequent collusive actions and tacit procuration, that damages be rewarded consistent with their crimes.

6. AGREED that Vxxxxxxx Ann; Hxxxxxxx be entitled to the remedies proposed to resolve these matters in the private, AND

7. AGREED to payment of $133.01 for compensatory cost of seized Flag.

8. AGREED to payment of $100,000,000.00 for abuse of due process, detainment and deprivation of my liberty to travel in pursuit of the necessities of life and happiness.

9. AGREED to payment of $50,000,000.00 for illegal or unlawful seizure of a 1987 Toyota Camry without a lawful and true 4th Amendment Warrant.

10. AGREED to payment of $50,000,000.00 for unlawful distraint/interstate detainer under color of law.

11. AGREED to payment of $7,500,000.00 for Cruel and unusual punishment, . . . conspiracy, encroachment, abuse of authority under color of law.

12. AGREED to payment of $ 8,120,000.00 as consistent with USC Title 42, USC Title 28, USC Title 18, State/Commonwealth law, Admiralty, Maritime and Common Law statute and rules governing “wrongful acts”; Statutory damages in an amount not less than $10,000.00 per day since the date of seizure, February 1, 2006, ($5,000.00 per day times two (2) violations), times four (4) Affiants; SEAN P. MCGRAW, ESQ MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT COURT 45-3-03, CITY OF CARBONDALE POLICE DEPARTMENT, James Reed (Badge #126), Dave Fofi (Badge #110).

13. AGREED that all criminal commercial crimes including but not limited to the capture of Vxxxxxxx Ann; Hxxxxxxx’s 1987 Toyota Camry and metal, un-obscured Title 4 U.S.C. 1, 2 Civilian American Flag of the united States of America, with the printing "Sovereign, Private Property, Non-Commercial American" that identified an "Exempt Household Automobile" with the recorded lien conspicuously displayed on the Flag by an affixed sticker; 99-cv-2497, and as outlined in this tort Judgment is to be hereby turned over to the proper authorities for immediate execution of this tort Judgment against all the Affiants’ possessions and/or control whether as owner, agent, assignee, trustee and as applied to any and all payments consistent with their felonious actions that are inconsistent with their oaths-of-office all of which amount to the impeachable offenses of “high crimes and misdemeanors”.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to her Claim of Conusance, wherein Plaintiff/Aggrieved Party/Conusant, VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX, in appealing the controversy wrongfully presumed to be between Commonwealth v. Vxxxxxxx Hxxxxxxx has brought forward questions of jurisdiction wherein the laws, rules and procedure in this instance does not apply to her. She therefore, respectfully requests that this Court rightly apply the law, enter judgments in her favor, sanction the offenders, and grant the remedies specified in her Appeal.

Respectfully submitted on behalf of,
Vxxxxxxx Ann; Hxxxxxxx, Secured Party


By: __________________________________
VXXXXXXX A HXXXXXXX, Aggrieved Party/Conusant